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Anxiety, Time, and Ontological Security’s Third-Image Potential 
 
Andrew R. Hom (University of Edinburgh) 
Brent J. Steele (Univeristy of Utah) 
 
Forthcoming in Symposium on Ontological Security and Anxiety, International Theory 
 
Introduction 
Ontological security scholars scrutinize a variety of individual and state – or “first” and 
“second image” – processes, but pay less attention to international – or “third image” – 
phenomena. A key component of ontological security seeking is the narration of a Self – 
a story that establishes identity and manages anxiety over time. In this article, we begin to 
extend ontological security to third image theorizing. We argue that the autobiographical 
conceptions of international agents, along with other stories told about international 
politics, constitute “the international” as a system, society, community, or inhabitable 
space beyond and between first- and second-image relations. This holds important 
consequences for that realm’s identity, the identity of its constituents, and their 
possibilities for action. Indeed, the international realm shares more with individual or 
unit-level issues than previously acknowledged in ontological security studies (OSS) and 
International Relations theory more broadly.  
 
To develop this point, we focus on this relationship between narrative, anxiety, and time. 
We contend that ontological security issues resound in the third image once we shift from 
treating the international realm as social agents’ external environment to treating it as a 
collective agency project in its own right. Anxiety characterizes this realm for multiple 
reasons, not least its complexity and agents’ diverse attempts to make sense of it, both of 
which resist a consensus narrative about what precisely it is and how it hangs together. 
Moreover, features unique to the international realm also render it particularly anxious. 
We show this by distinguishing between fear and anxiety and by focusing on the anxiety 
management techniques found in second-image phenomena – namely attending to 
definite objects as threats, and “the construction and reproduction of stable systems of 
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meaning and morality” (Steele 2008:55; Rumelili 2015:12–13) and how these prove 
especially difficult in third-image processes. Doing so highlights the promise of OSS for 
further differentiating international fear and anxiety, for enabling novel explanations of 
international phenomena, and for elaborating third-image identity formation as a wide-
ranging timing effort to surmount a dynamic, processual environment full of 
interconnected coordination challenges (see Hom 2018:76–77).  
 
We begin by elaborating connections between narrative, anxiety, and time. We then pivot 
from the state focus in OSS towards its broader articulation in third-image theorizing, 
paying particular attention to the temporality and anxiety of international politics. We 
illustrate these implications in a third-image OSS reading of the Islamic State (IS). The 
conclusion suggests how third-image OSS can enrich IR and distinguish international 
politics from other forms of social life. 
 
Narrative, anxiety, and the constitution of time 
In OSS, anxiety results from a gap between the actor’s biographical narrative and its Self-
identity (Steele 2008:55).  Additionally, OSS provides a lens for examining the more 
general situation of experience and existence. It is not only the mis/fit between Self-
identity and narrative that matters, but also that between the narrative and the Self’s 
wider environment – something that OSS has far overlooked. In narrative theory, the 
latter mis/fit bears heavily on our experience of time as either manageable or 
overwhelming. Amid the chaotic flux of existence, stories help agents constitute a sense 
of time through orderly connections, stable meanings, and intelligible outcomes (Carr 
1986:183) – a poetic form of “emplotment” that renders time “human” (Ricoeur 
1984:21). Narrative helps us apprehend and organize diverse stimuli, and thereby 
constitutes time as a coherent flow or duration (see Hom 2020 chp. 3). 
 
Some might argue that temporal and environmental features are given to experience, but 
the narrative theory of action (see Carr 1986) understands them as practical products of 
emplotment. This activity is ongoing:  
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[A]t no level … is the narrative coherence of events and actions simply a “given” 
… Rather, it is a constant task, sometimes a struggle, and when it succeeds it is an 
achievement. As a struggle it has an adversary, which is, described in the most 
general way, temporal disorder, confusion, incoherence, chaos. … To experience, 
to act, to live in the most general sense, is to maintain and if necessary to restore 
the narrative coherence of time itself (also Ricoeur 1984:52; Carr 1986:96 emph. 
added).1 
 
Continuous narrative intepretation turns blooming stimuli into coherent experience. 
Emplotment then times several such experiences in a loosely serial order establishing a 
“now”, a “then”, and a “to come”.2 
 
The narrative constitution of time holds important consequences for agency. Actors 
become such by releasing tensions or fulfilling goals emanating from the story’s theme. 
To exercise agency “is to make the constant attempt to surmount time in exactly the way 
the story-teller does. It is the attempt to dominate the flow of events by gathering them 
together in the forward-backward grasp of the narrative act” (Carr 1986:61-62 emphasis 
added). So it is not only Self-identity coherence at stake in an agent’s narrative 
competence but also the “articulation” of its wider setting as “inherently or necessarily 
connected”, “natural” (Weldes 1999:154–55), and temporally structured.  
 
Self-identity narratives, then, must grapple with two important issues: 1) the coherence of 
“inner Selves”, which are an “environment of their own” (Steele 2008:34); and 2) the 
coherence of those Selves’ external environments, the constellation of stimuli of which 
they must “make sense” (Carr 1986:96) in order to persist. The boundary between the 
narrating Self and its external environment is blurry in at least two respects. First, Self 
and environment emerge from the same narrative. Because they are co-constitutive, 
changes in one implicate or directly stimulate changes in the other. Second, other actors 																																								 																					
1 Cash (Symposium) refers similarly to the psychological struggle “to avoid the collapse of 
‘time…’” 
2 While Arfi (Symposium) asserts the “out-of-jointness” of time, we highlight narrative’s capacity 
to time fragmentary experiences.  
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populate the external environment, and some play the role of the Self’s constitutive 
Other(s). So while we often think of a social agent acting in some free-standing setting 
and reacting to or against other agents, in an equally important sense the Self 
interpenetrates this wider context of actors and changes. Distinguishing one from the 
other (as we do by necessity below) represents an analytical abstraction from the messy 
fluidity of social life.  
 
The deeply entangled Self is an anxious one. Although most OSS focuses on the first 
issue above, the temporal value of narrative suggests the second is just as important. An 
unstable Self is indeed unsettling (Solomon 2014:674) but so is the incoherence or 
fluidity of its Self-understood world.3 These tensions add an outward focus to OSS’s 
emphasis on the inner Self, incorporating additional sources of discontinuity and anxiety 
to its account of social life. This is not to downplay anxiety emanating from within or 
“below” the second image, national Self, such as “internal others” (i.e. “strangers”) and 
non-state actors (Steele 2008:64; more on both below). Instead, it complements them by 
considering how the world beyond or above the Self might also produce ontological 
insecurity. Every narrative unfolds a self-sufficient world of its own (Ricoeur 1984:xi, 
81), so even autobiographies must propound a stable stage on which the Self acts and 
emerges as such.4 If the material for the stage changes too drastically, unexpectedly, or 
often, agents struggle to enact their Self and to comprehend their temporal environment.5 
Thanks to cognitive (we can ingest only a finite amount of information), intellectual (we 
can digest only part of that), and narrative limitations (every story reduces experience), 
there is no guarantee that significant, unpredicted, and indeed unpredictable changes will 
not also threaten agent’s entire worldview along with its identity. Both internal and 
external changes may produce anxiety in the Self as it attempts the twin tasks of 
establishing internal (self-identity) and external (temporal order) continuity.  
 																																								 																					
3 This issue resonates with questions about whether anxiety emanates from unit-level uncertainty 
or international factors (Zarakol 2010:6). 
4 This extends OSS claims that autobiography marks “one manifestation of a “reality production’” 
(Steele 2008:11) and Berenskoetter’s (Symposium) view of narratives as one of three primary anxiety-
controlling mechanisms. 
5 Like Cash (Symposium), this challenges the OSS claim that greater internalization only inhibits 
dynamism and possibility. 
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Bahar Rumelili (Symposium) argues that anxiety is a “constitutive condition” of 
existence. One consequence of our discussion is that it is the need to time (to synthesize 
meaningful change continua out of the wider, overwhelming flux of experience, as 
elaborated in Hom 2020 chp. 1), and situations in need of such timing, that engender 
anxiety. Good timing transforms a constant barrage of ambiguous and jumbly stimuli into 
a useful series, but the very need to do so reminds us of “‘the infinity of possibility’”, its 
lack of stable entities (i.e. it’s “no-thing-ness”), and its “dizzy[ing]” manifestation of 
“non-being” (Rumelili, Symposium).  
 
Drawing out these aspects of OSS foregrounds the interplay of order and meaning with 
discordant and “critical situations” in which “‘circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an 
unpredictable kind … threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines’” 
(Steele 2008:51). This interplay is temporal, for it is precisely the “‘fear of chaos’” and 
the anxiety entailed by social life that drives agents to develop and institutionalize 
routines (Steele 2008:60),6 and more generally to go on in the first place. Social agents 
continue to act, react, and reflect because they are finite, anxious beings in a complex and 
dynamic environment. This is not just a question of autobiographical continuity, it is also 
a matter of the Self’s hookup with its temporal context. As we discuss in the next section, 
matters of disorder or disjuncture not only challenge a social agent to react consistent 
with its identity commitments, they also destabilize its world-building narrative and that 
story’s temporal vision of how experiences and change processes hang together, with 
important implications for anxiety. 
 
OSS in IR’s third-image 
So far we have intimated how the international realm problematizes individual states’ 
ontological security by throwing up changes that vitiate their senses of Self and time. 
While this adds to IR’s account of the anxious Self, the discussion has not yet fully 
leveraged narrative’s third-image potential. To do so, we need to shift the referent object 
																																								 																					
6 Berenskoetter (Symposium) similarly refers to routines as “plucking the [Self] into … the 
‘longue duree’ of institutional time.” 
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of ontological security from states and other individual agents within the international 
realm, which remains a focus in most of this Symposium, to the international realm itself.  
 
There are strong precedents for this, evidenced by how the international realm regularly 
gets characterized as a stand-alone environment or substantive entity. Practitioners 
regularly refer to the “international community”, “international order”, “international 
economic system”, or simply “the world” in the singular. English School theorists 
contend that “international society” emerges within the anarchic system (Bull 2002) that 
provides structural realism’s independent variable (Waltz 1979). When scholars invoke 
the power of “history” or “time” as an explanation for otherwise unintelligible 
phenomena (see Hutchings 2008:28–53; Hom 2020 introduction and chp. 3) or conflate 
anarchy (lack of government) with disorder and chaos, they imply that the international 
realm is cohesive enough to possess causal powers.  
 
Although third image theorizing usually evokes the neo-neo debate on the strategic 
implications of anarchy, we propose to treat the international realm as a communal 
product toward which individual actors strive. This flows from our argument that Selves 
and their environments are not distinct and given but rather co-constitutively interwoven 
in the stories social agents compose and enact. While we acknowledge the Self’s external 
environment is bigger or somehow more than that which comprises its interior being, we 
think it is especially important here to focus on the ways in which both the Self and its 
wider context emerge together and remain contingent on each other. 
 
Approaching the third image this way comports with critical constructivist discussions of 
the co-constitution of the international realm and its actors (e.g. Onuf 2012).7 It draws 
various international agents together in a collective project to establish and maintain a 
shared ground of agency. Although they may conflict and compete, foment rivalries, go 
to war, and pursue other un-civil behaviors, international agents remain partners in the 
ongoing creation of the milieu that grants them their raison d’être—an anti-social 
																																								 																					
7 It also links OSS to poststructural discussions of how foreign policy discourses “first produc[e] 
representations of international or regional communities” (Weber 1995:106). 
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collective, at times, but never an asocial one, as implied by the fact that we refer to inter-
national relations rather than extra-national beyonds or foreign voids.  
 
Narrative theory’s emphasis on time and anxiety is especially useful for bridging OSS 
‘up’ to the third image. International agents belong to a loosely-knit group and “whatever 
else a group may be about, it must see to its own self-maintenance” (Carr 1986:163). In 
this sense, the international realm is not so different from its individual constituents’ 
autobiographical composition: “like an individual, a [group] at any moment has a sense 
of its origins and the prospect of its own death as it seeks to articulate its own internal 
coherence and integrity over time” (Carr1986:164). For instance, accounts of the modern 
international system often refer to its origin in the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, while 
challenges to the constitutive principles of that system, such as al Qaeda and the Islamic 
State (IS), confront it with conceptual instability. Both of these – the myth of a shared 
beginning and the specter of dissolution – reinforce the international realm’s coherence 
and identity as something that did come into being, that might cease to be, and that 
therefore currently is.8  
 
International laws and norms reinforce the idea of a substantive entity rather than a 
negatively constituted space. Territorial sovereignty, treaties, and legal conventions all 
reinforce the sense of an international “there there”. As Carr (1986:164) discusses, 
“conventions, constitutions, laws, and hierarchical structure” are crucial to a collective 
precisely because it is not mortal in the way that individuals are. A collective does not 
enjoy biological reproduction, nor does it face inevitable physical expiration. So a 
collective agent or project is at once more durable and more vulnerable than a biological 
individual—it is not naturally finite, but neither is it ontologically affirmed simply by its 
material presence. To exist, in each moment a collective must reproduce itself by 
enacting a cogent narrative that avoids the tug of decoherence and its association with 
non-being (Carr 1986:166–68).  
 
																																								 																					
8 On the ontology security of threatening routines, see (Mitzen 2006).  
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Inasmuch as international agents understand themselves as populating a society or 
community, as positioned within a system, or simply as occupying a shared time and 
space, their wider environment becomes a matter of ontological security. They need not 
fully identify with this project as strongly as individuals do with national identities (see 
Mitzen 2018:396, 404) to share a stake in its identity as a viable ground for agency. As 
Hidemi Suganami (1999:379) maintains, “[i]f agents are narratively constituted, so also is 
society,” and thus “the whole social world” can be understood as a “gigantic river of 
innumerable stories about itself and its components”. Such a collective project still 
requires constant maintenance in that its ontological persistence and temporal order 
depends on the stories told about it (Carr 1986:134–150). This point suggests that a wide 
range of stories support the formation of the “international” as a collective identity. 
 
First, and closest to extant OSS concerns, we can appraise international actors’ 
autobiographical narratives ass modes of Self-presentation but also as the building blocks 
of a general effort to configure the wider environment as a coherent, whole, world. Pace 
Shakespeare, all the world’s a stage constituted merely by its players. This need not 
necessarily shift the “who” that experiences international anxiety. Powerful states might 
see their own ontological security as coterminous with the international realm. Hegemons 
often find systemic disorder and important events “out there” bearing directly on their 
Self-identity (Steele 2010:31). Much like Weldes’ (1999) study of how American 
discourses of leadership and strength helped produce the Cuban Missile Crisis, we recall 
recent concerns in the United States about a world it no longer seems able to control, 
lead, or manage (setting aside the possibility that such influence was always limited and 
ephemeral). Russian incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, the robust and rapid rise of IS, 
the catastrophe of Syria – all of these suggest an increasingly shaky international stage on 
which US agency founders (see Obama 2007). In such cases it is often difficult to 
disaggregate national from international anxiety.  
 
Small states also might find their Selves implicated directly by international society, as 
with Belgium in 1914 (Steele 2008:chp. 5). This produces quite counterintuitive 
practices. Arfi (Symposium) focuses on the “small nations” habit of turning “anxiety into 
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fear” based on a “leap of faith” that they can cope better with fear. But the Belgian case 
adds a wrinkle to this process, with structural implications. Belgium’s autobiography 
emphasized its status as a neutral state with duties to European society on the whole, a 
society where neutral powers must defend themselves against aggression to preserve the 
norm of neutrality as a societal good. Belgian anxiety about upholding a value of 
European International Society trumped existential fear and encouraged an “act of 
national suicide” where “Belgian military advisers and decision makers were fully aware 
of which consequences would likely follow their decision” to reject Germany’s 
ultimatum and resist invasion (Steele, 2008, 108-109). Belgium was a “mortal nation” 
(Arfi, Symposium), but one that took a different “leap of faith” by sacrificing its 
existential security to confront the ontological insecurities associated with its dereliction 
of societal duty as a neutral party. Through national death, Belgium staved off 
international-societal anxiety. This episode also poses a counterpoint to Berenskoetter’s 
(Symposium) argument that attachments to continuity and stability inhibit “radical forms 
of agency”, for Belgium chose collective continuity over individual existence. Finally, 
this illustrates how porous the boundary between international agents and their wider 
environment can be, and broaches the possibility that it is precisely this fuzziness that 
drives agents to act in surprising ways. 
 
Second, narratives that are not actor-autobiographical (i.e. not told by and about a state, 
sub-state, or institutional Self) are still international autobiographies insofar as they 
propound some account of an international realm per se. We call these international 
autocosmographies, indicating a reversal of narrative focus or priority. Unitary 
autobiographies primarily construct an agent within some political cosmos, which they 
also constitute as a secondary effect. International autocosmographies primarily construct 
a political cosmos containing states and other agents. This realm exemplifies Suganami’s 
“whole social world” assembled from “innumerable stories” of the agentic, systemic, and 
societal variety. And it stems not only from practical political discourses but also from 
theoretical, historical, and legal accounts explicating its origins, its development, and its 
ligatures and limits (e.g. Waltz 1979; Onuf 2012). Although undoubtedly different, each 
of these posit some entity—a society, system, level, etc.—beyond the state that is not 
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simply a void, that is more coherent than chaotic flux, and whose presence depends upon 
certain features, constitutive agents, and actions. Reflecting a variety of purposes, these 
different accounts nurture a collective effort to constitute the international realm – IR’s 
third image – as a dynamic place the hangs together enough for international politics to 
be possible.  
 
In IR we often think of theoretical differences as a matter of perspectives or ways of 
cutting into “the international”. However, even a plethora of international 
autocosmographies addressing different phenomena and producing different temporal 
orders helps “world” the international as a nominally common ground for action (Agathangelou	and	Ling	2009).9 The importance of this is that despite much variation, 
whenever scholars or practitioners refer to “the international” as a self-sufficient stage for 
foreign relations, they recapitulate a unified vision of that realm complete with a 
recognizable identity and manageable dynamics. Individual third image theories, 
practical accounts, and formal codifications all provide tributaries for the “gigantic river” 
that narratively (re-)produces the international as a coherent and temporal entity. 
 
International anxieties 
The international realm only exists and persists as an identifiable entity if there is some 
intersubjective consensus on its features and limits; when its ontological status falters so 
does the world that international actors inhabit. The third image also depends on an 
orderly sense of time provided by the stories told about it. By “telling and retelling of 
stories … a society’s components form a continuously present collectivity of a particular 
standing and identity” (Suganami 1999:379 emphasis added)—in this case a formally 
anarchic yet intelligible, somewhat cohesive, and more or less manageable space for 
foreign relations. The more people talk about the international, then, the more it manifests 
being and durative presence. At the limit, the product of effective and collective narration 
comes to seem like a pre-existing and independently “real” structure. Yet stories told 
about the international realm differ, and they often do so with a greater range and 																																								 																					
9 This realm does not accommodate all global denizens (Agathangelou and Ling 2009), but 
practices of inclusion/exclusion still refer to and thus reproduce a shared space that makes 
inclusion/exclusion meaningful. 
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diversity than stories about individual agents. This fosters anxiety in the collective third 
image Self in at least four respects. 
 
First, given how contentious international political practices and theories are, insofar as 
each feeds this “gigantic river” of the international , every theoretical debate and 
practical-political conflict destabilizes that realm’s internal cohesion. Numerous IR 
approaches examine how such clashes trouble individual agents, but OSS can reframe the 
international by foregrounding its built-in tension between cosmographic-identity stakes 
and intra-cosmographic sticking points. Because the third image has no overarching 
referent (a point we return to below), its ontological security depends on the ability of a 
huge collection of stories to stitch together some minimal cohesion in the midst of 
dissensus and incommensurable values. The idea that the international realm comes into 
being through the sort of diverse and discordant narratives that produce anxiety in other 
agents suggests it emerges and unfolds as an intrinsically anxious, ontologically insecure 
entity. 
 
Second, unless they are explicit accounts of the international realm (e.g. systemic IR 
theories or global political histories), these stories (e.g. a historical account of a particular 
war or national origin story) configure the international as a backdrop or secondary 
element. Consequently, the collective international project is a much more dispersed and 
diffuse affair, both spatially—in the sense of numerous accounts—and temporally—in 
the sense that it is provisional and vulnerable to contrary murmurs and outright 
challenges. These aspects render it never quite fully, completely present.10  
 
Third, because international politics is co-constitutive with individual actors and because 
the border between the two is fuzzy rather than distinct, international politics may take on 
actor-internal anxieties. In critical situations individual agents experience anxiety about 
whether their identity remains adequate to a changing world, whose own identity as an 
inhabitable environment also comes into question because it depends on those agents’ 
																																								 																					
10 This makes the international seem “close to nowhere, halfway across,” and yet “never more 
here” (Downie, Sinclair, Fay, Langlois, and Baker 2002). 
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participation. These three issues inhibit the second anxiety management mechanism 
mentioned earlier, the (re)production of stable meaning systems. This task is challenging 
enough in unit-level situations, but it only increases in third image contexts characterized 
by more contested and more dispersed accounts. 
  
Finally, the international Self is coterminous with its inhabitable world. For other 
narratively constituted beings, discord remains challenging but might reinforce identity 
cohesion if understood to emerge outside that Self as a constitutive Other (Carr 
1986:159). Even in confronting the Self, external Others offer a common experience of 
an “independent object” beyond the in-group that encourages a “we-relationship” within 
(Carr 1986:134). They also offer sites where nebulous anxiety can be turned into concrete 
fear.  
 
Unlike other collective projects, the international Self lacks a ready constitutive Other.  A 
state or institution can define itself against its direct counterparts. The international realm  
has no clear analog.11 Inasmuch as it must be (re)produced without the help of external 
Others, this marks a novel experiment in political imagination. No “external threat[s]” or 
“outsiders” reinforce the cohesion and coherence of its “inside” (Carr 1986:135). It hangs 
together only by virtue of its internal constitution.12 Taken together, these four points 
suggest that “the international” is never quite settled and persists instead as a bubbling 
and often troubling milieu. 
 
Now, since a Self may work on itself (Steele 2008), past international orders could 
provide this Other in principle. For instance, numerous agents have constructed and 
legitimized novel orders against past arrangements deemed responsible for catastrophe. 
Territorial sovereignty followed the wars of religion; the Napoleonic Wars, the Concert 
of Europe; World War II, the United Nations. Such orders define themselves by what 																																								 																					
11 When they bracket ‘out’ phenomena as insufficiently political (i.e. merely “relations”) or 
systemic (i.e. unit-level), parsimonious theories manage anxiety by constructing conceptual Others that 
implicitly define the properly international Self (Waltz 1979). 
12 Indicatively, the age of exploration, which produced ideas of earth as a single world, was 
“crucial to the development of science fiction” as “an imaginative space in which humanity might 
encounter radically different beings—aliens, the material embodiments of … alterity” and of our “fear of 
the unknown” (Roberts 2016:75, 86). 
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they leave behind – extremism, (European) imperial ambition, totalitarianism and 
Holocaust. Yet temporal Othering on an international scale does not easily resolve the 
tension between competing interpretations of the past, which constrains new prospects 
and raises the possibility that the international was never “there” as we much as thought. 
This is because temporal Othering depends on the ability to index contemporary Others 
to the past Self (see Hom and Steele 2016:191–93). 
 
Third image anxiety owes much to this tension between collective project and internal 
interpretive differences. Whereas external difference readily becomes a definite object 
and existential threat, internal inconsistencies or dissents primarily highlight an anxious, 
“uncomfortable disconnect [with the] Self” (Steele 2008:51–52). This does not depend on 
any particular identifiable source of instability – indeed, it is the not knowing what will 
emerge or the prospect of the “unknown” bubbling up within a purportedly coherent 
environment that generates ontological insecurity (see Rumelili 2015:12). Because the 
international realm’s sources of in/security necessarily come from within, this challenges 
not only particular narratives but narrative competency as such – the possibility of a 
viable ground for social relations on a global scale. Loosely collected and contentious 
narration helps constitute the international realm as a recognizable whole, but one where 
the possibility of an ordering principle is continually called into question. There may be a 
there there, but it remains exceedingly difficult to discern just what there is in a durable 
sense. Its peculiar narrative constitution renders the international minimally 
apprehensible to many but fully comprehensible to none—and thus arch anxious. 
 
Anxiety, not fear, then, is an intrinsic attribute of international politics. Other than 
thermonuclear war or climate change, there are comparatively few things that threaten the 
existential viability of the realm. Contrary to conventional Hobbesian presentations of a 
fear-driven “state of nature,”13 we should understand the international as a persistently 
anxious attempt to nurture a collaborative social whole under dynamic and uncertain 
conditions, and one with no recourse to the anxiety-management resources of 
constructing against external objects or turning these into threats.  																																								 																					
13 Rumelili (Symposium) develops an anxiety-based reading of Hobbes. 
	 14	
 
This is not to say that existential threats and fear do not influence international politics. 
However, these phenomena tend to emanate from dyadic or second image issues where 
one state (or small group) threatens another, engendering unitary or regional fear. Or they 
already fit comfortably within stories like structural realism’s formally anarchic system 
churning cycles of competition, conflict, and balancing (Waltz 1979). Through 
autocosmographic narration, ontological security suggests that we should also look at 
ideas, events, and processes that unsettle the workings and order of the international 
whole. These signal an uncomfortable disconnect of the international Self. Possible 
sources include practical challenges to international ordering principles but also 
conceptual alternatives to mainstream third image theories. All challenge the view of the 
international system as composed solely of territorial sovereign states under anarchy—
either by expanding the definition and roster of members or by challenging the sense that 
such a community functions smoothly, predictably, and continuously. While these 
challenges may not be strictly systemic, they mark internal sources of disruption 
analogous to domestic “strangers” who “cause anxiety” in the nation-state because they 
undermine its ability to provide order or express the possibility of chaos within that order 
(Steele 2008:71, 64). In contrast with the international system (Waltz 1979) where formal 
anarchy leads to chronic fear, we view the “international” as a realm of conceptual 
anarchy that exists as such through diverse stories that destabilize organizing principles, 
habituated interactions, and other repertoires of ordering. Because they emerge from and 
announce a vulnerability within, these international-internal strangers engender one of 
two responses. Either autobiographies and autocosmographies can be revised to 
accommodate them or other inhabitants can securitize them, moving them from the 
anxious category of “stranger-other” to a “stranger-enemy”, an existential threat eligible 
for coercive responses (Carr 1986:135; Weber 1995:54; Kinnvall 2004:751–53; also 
Steele 2008:64) but still unsettling to an international project born and raised in anxiety. 
 
International anxiety and the Islamic State 
Although it began officially in 1999, the Islamic State (IS) attained international 
prominence from 2010 on, when its new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, greatly expanded 
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its reach by forcefully taking territory in Syria and Iraq. In 2014 after US airstrikes, the IS 
began a kidnapping and beheading campaign publicized online as well as undertaking 
terrorist attacks from Pakistan to the United Kingdom and a series of IS-”inspired” 
attacks even further afield. At this point, an international coalition began forcefully 
rolling back IS territorial and operational gains. At the time of writing, IS lost most of its 
territory and Donald Trump declared it “100 percent defeated”, although other leaders 
and his own officials insisted it would remain a problem going forward (Lister 2019). 
Defeated but not defunct, IS still preoccupies many national and international security 
agendas.  
 
IS challenges multiple autocosmographies by its forceful re-bordering of sacrosanct 
territory, its spectacular affronts to international norms, and its proposal to replace 
national ordering principles with denominational ones in a “territorial caliphate” (see 
Friis 2017:18). In systemic terms, as a non-state actor the IS is an external Other but one 
whose conquest of large swathes of Iraq and Syria directly challenged the territorial 
sovereignty that defines the system’s functionally identical units. In broader terms, IS is 
an internal stranger, an agent birthed from within the dynamics of the “international 
community”. In addition to Levantine military campaigns, IS attacks on citizens abroad 
highlight the contingency both national collectives (Friis 2017:16) and the international 
order they help constitute (Mendelsohn 2005). Part of what makes IS so unsettling, so 
productive of widespread fear and anxiety, and another expression of what Berenskoetter 
(Symposium) might call “radical agency”, is its ability to move seamlessly back and forth 
between these security registers, evincing an existential challenge to some states and an 
ontological problem for the international realm as a whole.  
 
In line with the Symposium’s animating concerns, we argue that international reactions to 
IS depends more on the latter – the most important political effects of IS stem from the 
ways it engenders international anxiety, not fear. Other than Iraq and Syria for brief 
amounts of time (ca. 2015, for instance), IS posed no survival threat to states – especially 
its most ardent Western adversaries. But its seemingly random terror campaigns and their 
increasingly global reach generated significant temporal uncertainty. Its claims to a 
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superior political ordering principle (e.g. a “new caliphate”) posed an internal source of 
disorder and challenged the ontology of the international realm as a common space for 
state or state-based action, and one that unfolds in an orderly fashion. Indeed, IS 
proposed entirely different modes of co-existence, different “‘right[s] to punish’”, and, 
crucially, a different way to use violence to produce “civil order” and “a comprehensive 
vision of society” (Friis 2017:8–13) than those on which the modern international order 
rests.14 The problem of IS is not just territorial governance, but who can mobilize “chaos 
and order in chorus – destruction and creation at once” as well as how and when they 
should do so (Friis 2017:16). And by threatening various polities with sporadic violence, 
IS deliberately undercuts the promise and even the premise of a well-ordered and secure 
international whole. 
 
Ontologically insecure actors often elect to push internal sources of anxiety “out” and 
turn them into objects of fear. International responses deny IS legitimacy. In terms of 
military action, this comports with previous attempts to re-establish international order in 
the face of sub-state provocations (Mendelsohn 2005). Yet, tellingly, these responses 
work in tandem with vigorous narrative efforts to excommunicate IS from the 
international realm: IS “shocks the conscience of the entire world” (Ackerman 2014), so 
“we” must “degrade and destroy” or “bomb the hell out of” it as a matter of “shared 
security”. Doing so will “replace chaos with peace” (Usborne 2016). These ways of 
talking about IS highlight the ontological struggle it poses between two ways of 
deploying violence to induce an ordered international Self from chaos. They have 
become international common sense, even though IS poses no credible threat to the 
existential survival of states or the states system and even though (according to traditional 
security logics) fixing it to a delimited territorial container would make it more deterrable 
than other, loosely networked organizations.  
 
National security logics of survival, threat, and deterrence cannot explain the vociferous, 
collective, and near-unanimous response of powerful international actors to this 
																																								 																					
14 IS’s reliance on violence to construct order further destabilizes international selves by recalling 
their own legacies of constitutive violence. 
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Lilliputian challenge. OSS can through a focus on the tension between anxiety, collective 
identity, and a stable sense of time. The Janus ideas of sovereignty and anarchy, norms 
such as diplomacy and the keeping of contracts, and the laws of war are types of reflexive 
routines that orient inhabitants toward a shared realm amidst a welter of confusing 
stimuli, indicate how they should “‘grasp and live’” their foreign affairs (Steele 2008:61), 
and prevent them from having to “learn” each foreign interaction anew without any 
extant social cues, habits, or expectations (Mitzen 2006). Without them, political actors 
would be not so much constrained by various material or structural factors as unfettered 
and thus paralyzed by myriad possibilities. Absent ordering principles that lend that 
international realm a minimal sense of cohesion and order, it would be difficult to grasp 
together in a single image. Moreover, it would be an uninhabitable foreign flux, utterly 
indeterminate and chaotic, and full of anxiety. In this way, the international realm shares 
much with its constituent parts in that its foundational narratives and practices function to 
reduce the “dizzying” effects of a blank slate or a sheer, chaotic flux (see Steele 
2008:61).  
 
This helps explain why novel actors with alternative proposals – even weak ones like IS – 
produce international crises full of anxiety. They confront international inhabitants not 
with an elimination threat but with the dissolution of working narratives and a return to 
the void of overwhelming possibilities. Such challengers kill comparatively few but 
broach paralysis for all by throwing the possibility of a stable international realm into 
radical doubt.  
 
Recall that while external shocks may disturb our clockwork routines and remind us of 
the destabilizing flux of time, they also reinforce a constitutive story of the collective that 
they confront, a collective whose “way of being in and dealing with time” (Carr 
1986:149–50, 185) actually benefits from such experiences if it can re-inscribe them in a 
smooth temporal trajectory. International political challenges necessarily come from 
within. So rather than tempering (challenging, then galvanizing) the international 
collective, these instances of difference offer few constitutive Othering benefits and 
thoroughly complicate the identity of the temporal, cosmographical stage for 
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international agency. They present the international project only with the angst-ridden 
work of the Self on itself, affected through dispersed and contentious autocosmographies 
and their fraught, laborious revision. The most expeditious response to internal 
strangeness may therefore be to reinterpret them as existential threats rather than 
undertaking the wholesale revision of various third image narratives. When international-
internal “strangers” and conceptual challenges like IS emerge, the community response 
tends toward conservatism and securitization. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that by focusing on time, ontological security can recast third image 
theorizing around the pervasive issue of anxiety, which is particularly difficult to manage 
at the international level with the practices and routines typically featured in OSS. First, 
while international orders of the past may provide a type of Other, they prove less useful 
as objects of fear than elements of Whiggish origin stories.15 Second, while the 
(re)production of stable systems of meaning and morality via narratives help the 
international realm hang together, different actors within that realm narrate its identity, 
meaning, and morality differently. Insofar as these constitutive stories inherently call into 
question the possibility of a stable and decisive principle for ordering “the international”, 
they make anxiety its pervasive condition and ontological insecurity its baseline.  
 
Narrative theory helps reinforce OSS’s account of agent-internal dynamics by showing 
how environmental changes can stimulate anxiety as much as biographical disconnects 
can. We have argued that in such cases, an agent’s sense of time may falter along with its 
sense of Self. Narrative theory also helps contextualize the international as a collective 
effort to grapple with pure possibility rather than as an impersonal and constraining 
framework for state action. On this view, the international emerges from manifold stories, 
routines, and processes that optimally offers its constituents a temporally structured 
ground for action.  
 
																																								 																					
15 They can excommunicate contemporary difference, but this is not so much the work of the Self 
on the Self as an effort to turn part of the Self into an Other rather than rethink identity. 
	 19	
OSS and temporality thus understand international politics as continuous with but also 
different from first and second image theorizing. In all three, Self-identity and an orderly 
sense of time are essential to social life and purposeful action. But compared with 
individual human and unit-level phenomena, which are ensconced in external ordering 
structures, the third image focuses our view on the acme of ontological tension. The 
international realm is where the tension between collective identity and routinized 
actions, on the one hand, and pure possibilities and the overwhelming “flux of time”, on 
the other, remains most fraught, in part because international ordering practices are more 
multiplicitous and ambiguous with more for maneuver than the individual and domestic 
counterparts. It is where the basic human relationship to time and its modern clockwork 
variant, which privileges standardization and routine, play for the largest and highest 
stakes: the identities of social agents and their dynamic cosmos. It is where constitutive 
narratives that work on lower levels falter due to complexity, scale, or unforeseen 
consequences. It is where “our” (however understood) ability to establish a sense of Self 
and a sense of time matters the most and requires the greatest effort. 
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